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Has Hays failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when it
imposed concurrent sentences 0f thirty-ﬁve years with seventeen years ﬁxed 0n a conviction for
rape, and ten years ﬁxed 0n a conviction for burglary?

ARGUMENT
Hays Has Failed T0 Show That The
A.

District

Court Abused

Its

Sentencing Discretion

Introduction

On July 28,

2018, Cathryn Mitchell was

at a

bar With friends

when Joshua Allen Hays, an

acquaintance of one of those friends, arrived. (PSI, p.
after leaving the bar

an address.

and go

(Id.)

bell.

the

(Id.)

(PSI, p. 4.)

ways.

Hays

(Id.)

At approximately 1:00

arrived at her

When n0

home by taxi

(Id.)

get out. (Id.)

(Id.)

were going

According

a.m.,

t0 her

house and provided

cab,

Ms. Mitchell was sleeping alone

knocked 0n the

one answered, he climbed over her back

home through an unlocked back door and

sleeping.

that they

After leaving the bar separately from Hays, the group decided to end the evening

their separate

her bedroom.

and Ms. Mitchell responded

Hays asked where everyone was going

3. 1)

t0

entered the

Ms. Mitchell, she woke, noticed Hays

She then passed out due

t0 intoxication only t0

Though she repeatedly told him to

front door,

and rang the

He

then entered

gate.

bedroom

in

in

(Id.)

which Ms. Mitchell was

in her

room, and told him

to

wake up With Hays naked in her bed.

stop and leave, and physically resisted him,

Hays sexually

assaulted her, digitally penetrating her, forcing her t0 engage in oral sex, and penetrating her vagina

With his penis.

(PSI, p. 3.)

locked the door until Hays

have sex with a
Hays).)

left.

woman When

Asked Why he

She eventually crawled from her bed
(Id.)

In an interview with police,

she didn’t want to have sex With

tried t0

He

bathroom and

Hays admitted that he

me.”

“‘tried to

(PSI, pp. 4, 29-30 (quoting

have sex With Ms. Mitchell when he knew she did not want

responded, “‘1 wanted to have sex. Iwas drunk and horny.

Hays).)

t0 the master

Iknew

it

was wrong.

3”
(Id.

to,

he

(quoting

likewise wrote a letter apologizing t0 Ms. Mitchell, including for “not listening t0

you.” (Exhibits Appeal 46853-2019,

p. 29.)

But he

later

claimed both

at trial

and

in

an interview

with the presentence investigator that while there was some sexual contact between him and Ms.
Mitchell,

1

it

was consensual, she

initially

asked him to

stay,

and he

left

0n the ﬁrst occasion she

Citations to the “PSI” are t0 the electronic ﬁle “Conﬁdential Exhibits Appeal 46853-2019.pdf,”

Which contains the PSI and other sentencing documents.
2

suggested that he should. (PSI, pp. 4-5, 16;

Hays was charged with rape and
p. 32),

Tr., p.

433, L. 4

life

sentence with ten years

ﬁxed on

0f ten years on the burglary conviction.

L. 6.2)

burglary. (R., pp. 21-22.) After pleading not guilty (R.,

Hays was convicted by a jury 0f both charges

requested a

— p. 442,

At

(R., pp. 91-92).

sentencing, the state

the rape conviction, and a wholly

545, Ls. 1-10.)

(T12, p.

ﬁxed sentence

Hays recommended a uniﬁed

sentence of thirteen years With three years ﬁxed, and asked the court t0 suspend the sentence and
place

Hays on

probation. (TL, p. 550, L. 21

— p.

551, L. 4.)

district court

imposed a uniﬁed

the rape conviction, and a Wholly

ﬁxed

sentence 0f ten years 0n the burglary conviction, With those sentences t0 run concurrently.

(TL,

sentence 0f thirty-ﬁve years With seventeen years

p. 579, L. 11

On

—p. 580,

L. 3; R., pp. 144-45.)

appeal Hays argues the district court abused

mitigating factors, including his strong

and his remorse. (Appellant’s
its

ﬁxed on

The

employment history,

brief, pp. 3-6.)

Hays has

its

discretion

by

failing to consider

the support of his family and friends,

failed to

show that the

district court

abused

sentencing discretion.

B.

Standard

Of Review

The length of a sentence

is

reviewed under an abuse 0f discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State V. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472,

159 P.3d 838 (2007)).

It is

presumed

that the

2

a sentence

is

V.

Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
Will be the defendant's

Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).

Within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that

Citations t0 “Tr.” are to the electronic ﬁle “Transcript

the transcript

V.

ﬁxed portion 0f the sentence

probable term of conﬁnement. Li. (citing State

Where

475 (2002); State

from the two day jury

trial

Appeal 46853-2019.pdf,” containing both

and the sentencing hearing.
3

it

is

a clear abuse 0f discretion. State V. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing

State V. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d

Whether the

district court: “(1) correctly

The abuse 0f

27 (2000)).

discretion test looks to

perceived the issue as one 0f discretion; (2) acted within

the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable t0
the speciﬁc choices available t0

Lunneborg

C.

V.

MV Fun Life,

it;

and

(4)

a sentence

its

decision

by

the exercise 0f reason.”

163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).

Hays Has Shown N0 Abuse Of The

Where

reached

is

District Court’s Discretion

within statutory limits, the appellant must establish

that,

under any

reasonable View of the facts, the sentence was excessive t0 bear the burden 0f demonstrating an

abuse 0f discretion.

State V. Farwell,

144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).

In

determining whether the appellant met this burden, the court considers the entire sentence but,

because the decision t0 release the defendant 0n parole

is

m

exclusively the province of the executive

branch, presumes that the determinate portion Will be the period 0f actual incarceration.

Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017) (citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d

at 391).

To

establish that the sentence

was

excessive, the appellant

must demonstrate

that

reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate t0 accomplish the sentencing
goals 0f protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. Faiell, 144 Idaho at 736,

170 P.3d

at

401.

A

sentence

is

reasonable “‘if

it

appears necessary to accomplish the primary

objective 0f protecting society and t0 achieve any 0r
rehabilitation, 0r retribution.”

V.

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

1, 8,

The record supports

m,

all

0f the related goals 0f deterrence,

161 Idaho at 895—96, 392 P.3d at 1236—37 (quoting

m

368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).
the district court’s exercise 0f sentencing discretion.

acknowledges, neither sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

As Hays

(Appellant’s brief, p. 3.)

Burglary has a statutory
rape

is life

maximum

imprisonment,

I.C. §

of 10 years, LC.

And

18-6104.

§

18-1403, while the statutory

the sentences the district court

maximum

imposed were

reasonable t0 accomplish the sentencing goals, With the district court discussing extensively
that is so. (TL, p. 554, L. 5

in its entirety.

— p. 579,

However, the

for

Why

L. 10.) This briefwill not rehearse that extensive discussion

pointed t0 the disturbing nature of these crimes,

district court

involving breaking into Ms. Mitchell’s house; ﬁnding her alone and inebriated in her bed; being
told

by her to

assaulting

leave; walking out of the

house to pay a taxi and coming back into the house; sexually

Ms. Mitchell over an extended period 0f time While Ms. Mitchell

and repeatedly told Hays
p. 570, L. 18

—p. 572,

t0 stop

and leave;

L. 19; p. 575, L. 19

all

resisted physically

While Ms. Mitchell’s son was asleep upstairs. (TL,

—p. 578,

7 (Ms. Mitchell’s testimony regarding the crime).)

L. 15.

As

E

alﬂ

Tr., p. 179, L.

the district court noted,

23 —

p. 187, L.

Hays “had many

opportunities to recognize [his] error and abandon [his] criminal endeavor,” but proceeded t0 break

into

Ms. Mitchell’s home and use physical Violence

extended period 0ftime. (TL,

The

p. 577, L.

district court further

25 —

p.

t0 rape

and sexually assault her over an

578, L. 15.)

noted that the psychosexual evaluation determined that Hays was

a moderate risk t0 reoffend “compared t0 other sexual offenders, not compared to the general
population,” which indicated that

Hays was

“actually very dangerous.”

558, L. 23 (internal quotation marks omitted).

E

alﬁ PSI,

pp. 107, 129.)

(Tn, p. 557, L. 23

As the

—

p.

court noted, the

psychosexual evaluation discussed the attitude problems exhibited by Hays suggesting that he was

an unacceptable risk t0 reoffend.

(Tr., p.

560, L. 7

—

p.

641, L. 9.)

In particular, he exhibited

“sexual entitlement, minimization 0f his sexual offense, Victim blaming, hostile attitudes towards

women,

insufﬁcient fear 0f consequences, poor insight, poor impulse control, propensity towards

negative emotionality, fragile narcissism, poor problem-solving

skills,

and history of supervision

issues.” (PSI, p. 107.)

The court

also agreed With the evaluator’s conclusion that

sexual offender treatment than most sexual offenders,”’ noting that
t0 accept responsibility

108, 143).

E

alﬂ PSI,

and express remorse. (TL,
p.

24 —

p. 558, L.

Hays was

“‘less

Hays had

consistently refused

p.

559, L. 11 (quoting PSI, pp.

141 (pointing t0 Hays’ “10W motivation for treatment and minimization

0f his sexual offense” as indicative as a 10w amenability t0 treatment).)
t0 assert that

The jury

to

d0

so.

(TL, p. 433, L. 4

clearly did not credit Hays’ testimony,

and neither did the

Mitchell’s,

Hays continued

Indeed,

any sexual contact between he and Ms. Mitchell was consensual and

house 0n the ﬁrst occasion that he was asked
testimony).)

amenable for

district court.

(noting that while Ms. Mitchell’s testimony

(Tr., p.

was

which

555, L. 5

credible,

—

— p. 442,

he

left

directly conﬂicted with

Hays’ was

not).)

E

her

L. 6 (Hays’ trial

Ms.

577, Ls. 12-21

p. 556, L. 3; p.

Idaho 126, 129, 952 P.2d 1262, 1265 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that

that

State V. Li, 131

district court

was

entitled to

consider “credibility gap and apparent lack 0f deep remorse” in determining appropriate sentence).

Hays’ continual attempts t0 minimize his conduct and blame the Victim suggested not only that he

was not amenable

to treatment, but that

he showed n0 remorse

at all.

(PSI, p. 16 (“The defendant

vehemently denied culpability for the present offense. Further, he shifted blame
stated he feels ‘both parties’

The

district court

had a part

his insistence

him

and

in the crime.” (quoting Hays)).)

reasonably concluded that Hays

“society must be protected” from

t0 the Victim

(T12, p.

is

“a great danger t0 society” and

564, Ls. 13-19; p. 575, Ls. 4

—

p. 578, L. 15); that

on blaming the Victim and avoiding responsibility indicated he was not a good

candidate for rehabilitation in the community, but that he could be rehabilitated in prison (TL, p.
558, L. 24

— p.

559, L. 11; p. 567, Ls. 1-10); that, both because 0f the heinous nature of the crime

and because of his refusal

t0 take responsibility, general

signiﬁcant sentence (T12, p. 572, L. 20

— p.

crimes, a signiﬁcant term of imprisonment

On

and speciﬁc deterrence require a

575, L. 3); and because of the heinous nature of these

is

appeal, though he does not say

appropriate t0 serve as punishment

(id.).

what sentence would have been appropriate, Hays

claims that the district court failed to give proper consideration t0 his “status as a ﬁrst time
offender” (Appellant’s brief, p. 4), his “strong employment history” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-5),
his “family

and friend support” (Appellant’s

brief, p. 5),

participate in treatment (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6).

each.

that

The

district court

he presented

and testimony” of support, and

report that [Hays] do[es] have an excellent

it

work

as mitigating. Hays’ reliance

on

his alleged

that “it

(Id.) It

is fairly

was evident from

ethic.” (TL, p. 563, Ls. 6-16.)

was “taking that into account.”

to

the contrary, the district court considered

noted as mitigating the fact that Hays’ “criminal history

“letters

explicitly stated that

T0

and his remorse and willingness

did not

fail t0

limited,”

the presentence

The

district court

consider those factors

remorse and willingness t0 participate in treatment

is

particularly ironic in light of the district court’s extensive discussion 0f his refusal to take

accountability, his minimization of his conduct,

district court noted,

565, Ls. 9-12.)

Hays has “not indicated

and

his shifting

in the record

0f blame t0 the Victim. As the

any meaningful remorse

at all.” (Tr., p.

For similar reasons, the psychosexual evaluator concluded that Hays had 10W

amenability to treatment.

(PSI, pp. 140-41.)

Thus, the

district court certainly

considered his

alleged remorse (0r, lack thereof) and amenability t0 treatment.

Hays
something

it

is

simply asking

does not d0.

this

E

Court t0 reweigh the

State V.

district court’s

Windom, 150 Idaho

sentencing determination,

873, 879, 253 P.3d 310, 316 (Where

appellant claimed that the district court inadequately considered allegedly mitigating factors,

holding that this Court’s “role

is

not t0 reweigh the evidence considered by the district court”);

State V. Thurlow, 152 Idaho 256, 261,

this

269 P.3d 813, 818

Court reweigh the evidence presented before the

conclusion. However, as mentioned above, to do s0

(Ct.

App. 201

district court

1)

(“Thurlow requests

and

that

arrive at a different

would be contrary t0 our established standards

of review”).

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

DATED this

Court to afﬁrm the judgment of the

district court.

11th day of December, 2019.

/s/

Andrew V. Wake

ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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